The Auditor's Off-Equilibrium Behaviors.
在信息经济学框架下，研究当机器审计师被人类取代后，委托人如何应对审计师的独立性问题，通过多种纳什均衡概念分析能否防止审计师不实报告。
Abstract The article examines the issue of the auditor's independence within the information economics paradigm. Once the machine auditor is replaced by the human auditor, the principal now has to confront the issue of the auditor's independence. Hence, the co-alitionally dominant strategy equilibrium, the Strong Nash equilibrium, the Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium, the Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium, and the dominant strategy equilibrium concepts are considered in addition to the Nash equilibrium concept to see whether one can prevent the auditor's non-truthful reporting. It would be unreasonable to assume that the owner, the manager, and the auditor all can costlessly observe the auditor's action after its selection by the auditor, or that the auditor is not subject to moral hazard for some reason.