A New Examination of Auditor "Low Ball" Pricing: Theoretical Model and Experimental Evidence.
构建了审计市场“低价揽客”的理论模型，并用实验室市场数据检验，发现低价揽客可在无交易成本下发生，且与“意见购买”行为一致，模型预测得到实验支持。
Abstract SUMMARY: This paper develops a theoretical model of "low ball" pricing in the audit market, and tests it using data from laboratory markets. This study contributes to the auditing literature by developing a new economic rationale for lowballing. Lowballing is predicted to occur without positive transaction costs, and behavior in the model is consistent with the concept of "opinion shopping" in the audit market. Testing this model also advances the literature by providing empirical evidence on the validity of the model, which advances our understanding of lowballing in the audit market. The model's predictions concerning prices, seller-buyer contract and recontracting pairs, and time path of prices are generally supported in the markets. Lowballing is evident as sellers set prices in period I below their period 1 costs.