Discussion of The Auditor's Off-Equilibrium Behaviors.
讨论了审计师在信息不对称和道德风险下的非均衡行为，指出经理人总会虚增利润以最大化报酬，而所有者除非无限审计否则无能为力。
Abstract The article presents a discussion of the auditor's off-equilibrium behaviors. It is known that moral hazard and information asymmetries limit people's ability to reach mutually beneficial agreements in organizations or markets. The author states that a problem of moral hazard may arise when an owner (" the principal") hires an auditor or a manager (" the agent") to perform some task under conditions such that the agent's privately taken actions affect the outcome or results. The conclusion suggests that managers will always inflate results (profits) in order to maximize their remuneration, and therefore, the owners (shareholders and directors) are helpless unless they wish to spend unreasonably large sums of money to have the auditor's work checked by another auditor whose work then will be checked by yet another auditor and so on, ad infinitum.