The Economics of Taxpayer Venue Choice: Effects of Informational Asymmetries.
用博弈论分析纳税人在与国税局纠纷中选择诉讼地点的决策，发现国税局的最优和解要约取决于法院区分有罪与无罪的能力及双方诉讼成本，且当国税局以最大化预期收入为目标时，地点选择不会传递信息。
Abstract Taxpayers unwilling to settle disputes with the IRS administratively must choose among several venues in order to defend their interests. This study examines the taxpayer's choice of venue from a game theory perspective. We describe the litigation process as a two-player game with asymmetric information, where taxpayers have private information as to their guilt or innocence. The IRS offers to settle out of court and taxpayers can either accept or reject this settlement demand. We find that the optimal IRS settlement demand depends upon the ability of the courts to discriminate between the guilty and the innocent, as well as upon the out-of-pocket legal costs of the players. Further, venue choice is never an informative signal when the IRS' goal is to maximize expected revenue. When minimization of expected incremental social costs is the IRS' objective function, the taxpayer's venue choice may in some cases transfer information to the IRS.