External Audit and Asymmetric Information.
建立了一个简单模型，解释为什么公司即使没有强制要求也会主动聘请外部审计师：当审计带来的股价提升超过审计费用时，所有者有激励聘请审计师，但经理质量过低时则不会。
Abstract The article presents a simple model to explain the existence of demand by corporations for audit services even in the absence of a mandatory requirement by regulatory bodies to do so. If the additional price that the owner/manager of the corporation can get from a given ownership share (relative to what he/she could obtain had only an average quality been attributed to the manager) as a result of the auditor's attestation is higher than the auditor's fee, he/she will have an incentive to hire the auditor. There is a minimum manager quality, however, below which the manager would not want to hire an auditor. This is so because below a minimum quality level, the increment in price that the manager can get for the ownership share beyond what he/she would get, had an average quality been attributed to him/her, would be smaller than the audit fee.