A Note on Audit Committee Independence: Evidence from the NYSE on "Grey" Area Directors.
研究发现纽约证券交易所公司审计委员会中普遍存在“灰色”领域董事，他们虽非公司雇员但与公司或其管理层有关联，且许多人有直接或间接财务利益，可能损害审计委员会独立性。
Abstract "Grey" area directors are those, who, although not employed by the corporation on whose board they serve, are affiliated with it or its management. Evidence is presented which indicates that "grey" area director representation on audit committees is pervasive across NYSE firms and over time. Moreover, the affiliation or background of many "grey" area directors suggests that they enjoy a direct or indirect financial interest in the firms on whose audit committees they serve. These findings raise concern that such directors may be a potential source of violations of audit committee independence.