Planning Assurance Services.
研究了审计师在规划保证服务时如何评估风险，发现保守主义在用户驱动的保证服务中作用较小，且审计师会因经济原因保持高质量，不损害声誉。
Abstract Our purpose is to investigate the strategies an auditor will use to assess risk when planning for the provision of a type of assurance service. The assurance service that we model is the delivery of information from the auditor to an investor. Our primary objective is to explore the extent to which risk assessment strategies that are employed in the provision of traditional auditing services carry over to the assurance service that we model. We find that unlike audit services where conservatism can be the cure for the "auditor's curse," or a protection against legal liability, in assurance services that are user-driven there is a lesser role for conservatism as a universal property of the information system. We also find that auditors who supply assurance services (of the variety we model) will not compromise their reputation as high-quality auditors because assurance services will be provided at a high level of quality for economic reasons, even without regulator restrictions.