The Effect of Partner Compensation Schemes and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles on Audit Partner Judgment.
研究了审计合伙人薪酬方案和GAAP如何影响审计师在客户冲突中的判断，发现薪酬与客户保留挂钩会损害客观性，而更具体的GAAP则增强客观性。
Abstract This paper examines the impact of audit partner compensation schemes and GAAP on audit judgments involving auditor-client conflict. These factors are important because of their potential impact on auditor objectivity. For example, objectivity may be compromised if a partner's compensation is closely tied to client retention. Alternatively, objectivity may be enhanced by GAAP which limits the acceptable range of auditor's judgments, thereby increasing consensus within the profession and reducing the credibility of clients' threats to switch auditors. Fifty-four audit partners participated in a study by completing hypothetical audit cases designed to allow varying ranges of acceptable accounting alternatives (e.g., (1) a restrictive case in which the client wanted to report higher values for marketable securities in direct violation of GAAP, vs. (2) a less restrictive case in which the client wanted to report a relatively small bad debt expense). For analysis purposes, respondents were categorized by the extent to which their firm emphasized local office profitability in determining partner compensation. This categorization scheme was derived from a preliminary investigation in which partners from six large public accounting firms identified important factors in determining partner compensation. This investigation revealed that the degree to which firms emphasized local office performance in determining individual partner compensation was a discriminating feature of compensation schemes. The validity of this categorization was corroborated later by respondents' answers to a compensation questionnaire. Findings indicate that: (1) partners with compensation more closely tied to client retention were less likely to require downward adjustments to income, suggesting that the design of audit partner compensation schemes may have an effect on auditor objectivity and (2) more specific GAAP increased the likelihood that partners would require downward adjustments to income, suggesting that GAAP may limit the client's ability to influence the auditor's judgment. Results also suggest that internal monitoring mechanisms related to second partner reviews may vary systematically across firms. Thus, while differences in compensation schemes may affect auditor objectivity, between-firm differences in internal monitoring may moderate these differences.