Fiscal interventions as housing-related macroprudential tools: a comprehensive analysis
研究了提高房产税率和减少抵押贷款利息抵扣作为宏观审慎工具对抑制家庭债务的效果，发现两者均能降低房价和信贷，但福利影响取决于财政收入如何分配。
Abstract This article investigates the efficacy of raising tax rates on housing property and reducing mortgage repayment deductibility as macroprudential instruments to curb household indebtedness. We analyze the output and welfare implications of these measures, with a particular emphasis on the role of revenue allocation. Utilizing a dynamic general equilibrium framework, we find that while both instruments successfully reduce house prices and credit, raising tax rates on housing property induces more significant price contractions and higher short-run output costs. In contrast, reducing mortgage repayment deductibility is more targeted, effectively lowering mortgage default rates and minimizing collateral erosion. Welfare outcomes depend crucially on fiscal recycling: allocating revenues to public investment or debt reduction primarily benefits patient households, whereas directing revenues toward transfer payments mitigates the welfare losses of credit-constrained borrowers and maximizes benefits for renters by alleviating liquidity constraints.