A model of China’s agricultural crisis and famine in 1959–1961
构建了一个理论模型，分析集体化中规模报酬和集体规模对努力激励的影响，指出在自愿集体中偷懒并非必然占优，强制参与可能导致原本繁荣的集体崩溃。
Abstract The Chinese collectivization movement culminated in a famine from 1959–1961 that resulted in up to 30 million deaths. Lin argues that the famine was due to making collective membership mandatory. This turned a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma into a one-shot game with shirk as the dominant action. This paper shows that shirking need not be the dominant strategy. In a model with increasing returns or sufficiently small collectives, the prisoners’ dilemma is replaced with a coordination game. In this case voluntary collectives may either collapse or flourish, consistent with the historical evidence. This result follows from a theoretical model of effort incentives on collectives when output is equally shared. The model isolates the essential role played by returns to scale and by collective size. While shirking can emerge, it is far from guaranteed. Imposing mandatory participation can lead to a collapse of effort in a previously thriving voluntary collective.