CEO life history strategies – How evolution shapes preferences regarding on-the-job and off-the-job decisions
本文用生命史理论解释CEO偏好和决策，发现采取快生命史策略的CEO所在公司财务违规更多、会计稳健性更低、盈余管理更高，且个人更易犯罪、消费炫耀、杠杆更高。
We propose life history (LH) theory as an overarching theoretical explanation of CEO preferences and decision-making. LH theory has the potential to integrate prior research on variation in top executives’ impact on decision outcomes and to demonstrate how observable differences in behavior can be explained by evolutionary drivers. According to LH theory, individuals pursue fast or slow LH strategies. Fast individuals tend to follow accelerated reproduction strategies and engage in impulsive, opportunistic, and risk-seeking behavior. We theorize how CEO LH strategies shape both on-the-job and off-the-job decisions and thus add to a growing body of research on evolutionary drivers of preferences and decision-making in accounting. We measure CEO LH strategies based on biodemographic micro-data related to reproductive behavior. Our findings linked to on-the-job decisions suggest that firms managed by CEOs who pursue fast LH strategies exhibit more financial irregularities, lower accounting conservatism, and higher earnings management. Findings related to CEO off-the-job decisions show that fast CEOs are more likely to engage in criminal behavior and to have a higher conspicuous consumption and a higher personal leverage. By applying an LH theory lens, we reconcile and advance prior fragmented research on CEO preferences by showing a clear theoretical link between on-the-job and off-the-job decisions.