The Role of General Counsels in the Implementation of Changes in Accounting Estimates
研究发现，当盈余勉强达到分析师预测时，有总法律顾问的公司更可能通过增加利润的会计估计变更来达标，但这会降低盈余对未来现金流的预测能力，表明总法律顾问在会计准则内塑造报告灵活性而非仅起把关作用。
SYNOPSIS This paper examines how general counsels (GCs) in top management influence the use and timing of changes in accounting estimates (CAEs), an important but underexplored area in financial reporting. We provide evidence that when pre-CAE earnings narrowly miss analyst forecasts, firms with a GC in top management (GC firms) are more likely than non-GC firms to use income-increasing CAEs to meet or beat earnings expectations. These results are more pronounced for firms with weak integrity cultures, low analyst following, and non-industry-specialist auditors. We also find that in GC firms, post-CAE earnings are less predictive of future cash flows, suggesting a decline in earnings informativeness. Overall, our findings are consistent with GCs shaping the exercise of reporting discretion within GAAP rather than solely serving a gatekeeping function, highlighting how legal expertise at the executive level influences both the credibility and informativeness of reported earnings. Data availability: Data used in the analyses are obtained from public sources described in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M48.