Peer Learning, Enforcement, and Reputation
研究了一个两期学习模型，其中理性监管者建立严格执法的声誉，而自利企业通过不当行为测试监管者的执法倾向。透明环境下声誉关注内生地产生正或负的执法外部性，影响企业的不当行为决策。
ABSTRACT We study a two‐period learning model where a sequentially rational regulator builds a reputation for strict enforcement and self‐interested firms test the regulator's enforcement propensity through their misconduct. In the transparent setting, where misconduct and enforcement are observable between the firms, the regulator's reputation concern endogenously creates positive or negative enforcement externalities between the firms. When the reputation concern is strong, the enforcement externalities are negative and dominate the information externalities, encouraging misconduct. Otherwise, both externalities are positive and deter misconduct. Although a strong reputation always benefits the regulator in the opaque setting, it often backfires in a transparent setting.