Peer effects, analyst coverage, and capital structure: quasi-experimental evidence from European MiFID II regulation
研究分析师覆盖如何调节同行杠杆对企业资本结构的影响，利用MiFID II监管冲击发现分析师覆盖减少会加剧同行模仿，对理解企业模仿行为和政策制定有启示。
This paper investigates the moderating role of the information environment in depicting the relation between peer leverage and corporate capital structure. In addition, we exploit the MiFID II regulatory shock in a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design to test whether the peer-effect slope (i.e. firms’ leverage sensitivity to peer leverage) changes after the reform. Past research suggests that firms align their capital structures with their industry peers. However, it remains silent on the role of analyst coverage in moderating this relationship. Using panel data from 2011 to 2024, we study firms in five major European economies: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. We find that peer effects are significant but vary across countries. Analyst coverage robustly attenuates peer alignment, promoting fundamentals-based decisions. Crucially, the MiFID II regulatory shock, which prompted a contraction in analyst coverage, amplified peer leverage comovement in the EU. These outcomes offer a deeper understanding of when and why firms imitate peers and underline actionable implications. Practitioners and policymakers should recognise analyst coverage as a governance tool that limits excessive imitation, highlighting the importance of research support to sustain corporate diversity and financial resilience.