Renegotiation and heterogeneous beliefs with risk neutrality
研究了风险中性下委托代理模型中的重新谈判，发现共同信念时重新谈判无关紧要，而异质信念时重新谈判会将合同变为纯对赌，可能提高补偿成本甚至使某些行动无法实施。
I study a risk-neutral principal–agent model with moral hazard, limited liability, and renegotiation. With common beliefs, renegotiation is irrelevant under risk neutrality. With heterogeneous beliefs, renegotiation reshapes the contract into a pure “side bet”: after the action is sunk, the principal concentrates all promised compensation on the outcome the agent overweights the most, which can raise compensation costs and even make some actions non-implementable. Under the monotone-likelihood-ratio property and optimism (likelihood-ratio dominance), the disagreement-maximizing outcome coincides with the incentive-efficient outcome, so renegotiation is again innocuous.