Preferred Clearing and Post-Trade Costs
研究了在互操作性和优先清算两种制度下，中央对手方之间的费用竞争，发现优先清算增加交易成本但互操作性在特定条件下改善福利。
Abstract We study fee competition between an incumbent and entrant central counterparty (CCP) under two regimes: interoperability (trades clear at each party’s own CCP) and preferred clearing (trades clear at the incumbent unless both counterparties choose otherwise). Preferred clearing creates network effects that force the entrant to undercut aggressively, while the incumbent sustains higher fees. Fee spreads, average trading costs, and industry profits increase under preferred clearing. However, interoperability is costly because linked CCPs must post collateral against cross-CCP exposure. Interoperability improves welfare when link costs are either low or high enough that the incumbent drops fees to reduce clearing fragmentation.