Mergers in the Presence of Adverse Selection
研究了逆向选择下并购如何通过减少低效分类来提高福利，发现当企业规模小、支付意愿随成本适度增加且消费者成本偏斜时，并购有利于消费者；应用于非团体健康保险市场，13%的潜在并购能改善消费者剩余。
ABSTRACT In the presence of adverse selection, mergers can increase welfare through a reduction in inefficient sorting. I characterize the sorting externality internalized between merging firms in a tractable discrete choice model. Mergers benefit consumers when the firms are small, willingness to pay is moderately increasing in cost, and consumer costs are skewed. Applying the model to the non‐group health insurance market, 13% of potential mergers would improve consumer surplus. In markets where the sorting distortion exceeds $5 per person, nearly one‐third of mergers improve consumer surplus, highlighting the importance of considering adverse selection in merger evaluation.