Passed Over for Promotion: Evidence from Middle-Level Managers
利用中国一家大型电信服务商2014-2019年的数据，研究发现晋升概率高的中层管理者在落选后绩效下降，而更强的奖金激励和更可预测的晋升机制能缓解这一负面效应。
ABSTRACT Using data from a large telecom service provider in China between 2014 and 2019, we examine the impact of being passed over for promotion on subsequent performance for middle managers. Specifically, we find that there is a negative association between high promotion probability and post-pass over performance changes. Such negative association is less pronounced when bonus incentives are stronger and when promotions are more predictable. Our research highlights a hidden cost of promotion incentives and strategies organizations can use to mitigate this unintended negative effect for promotion pass over on high performers. Data Availability: The data used in this study are proprietary. Access to the data may be granted upon request, subject to the approval of the data providers and compliance with confidentiality agreements. JEL Classifications: M41.