Property Rights and Corporate Toxic Emissions: Evidence from the Enactment of Property Law in China
利用中国2007年《物权法》作为准自然实验，发现更强的产权保护能促使企业减少有毒排放，但这种效应依赖于外部监管和融资条件，并通过绿色创新和减排升级实现。
Abstract Property rights theory holds that stronger ownership protection stimulates firm investment, yet whether such investment supports environmentally beneficial uses remains unclear. We develop a property rights perspective on corporate pollution control, arguing that stronger ownership protection promotes cleaner production when complementary institutional conditions make environmental upgrading both strategically valuable and financially feasible. Exploiting China's 2007 Property Law as a quasi‐natural experiment, we find that firms more exposed to the reform significantly reduce toxic emissions after the Law . Importantly, this emission‐reducing effect is concentrated among firms operating under stronger external monitoring and among financially constrained firms that experience improved credit access. Mechanism tests show that green innovation and abatement upgrading partially explain the emission reductions. These findings extend property rights theory by showing that ownership protection does not automatically lead to cleaner production; its sustainability effects depend on monitoring and financing conditions that shape firms' strategic investment choices.