An Analytical Model of Behavior and Policy in an Epidemic
本文在一个均衡框架下分析易感个体的最优防护行为，发现个体理性导致过度谨慎，拉平疫情曲线但延长疫情，而社会最优则追求以最小成本最小化累计死亡。
This paper examines the behavior of individuals susceptible to a deadly disease in a tractable equilibrium setting. We analytically characterize individually optimal mitigation behavior and the resulting equilibrium trajectory. Analysis is facilitated by a phase diagram. A key insight is that individually optimal behavior of those susceptible to the disease results in excessive caution. This behavior flattens the epidemic curve and prolongs the epidemic. In contrast, socially optimal behavior results in a higher infection rate, with a focus on minimizing cumulative deaths at minimum cost. The paper offers novel technical contributions and an improved understanding of externalities in econ-epi models.