Disciplining or distorting? The impact of analysts' in-house networks on earnings management strategies
研究发现分析师覆盖总体上减少应计和真实盈余管理，但被网络中心性高的分析师跟踪的公司更倾向于用真实活动操纵替代应计方法，这种替代效应在信息不对称高或治理强的公司中减弱。
Purpose This study argues that the mixed evidence on how analyst coverage influences earnings management can be reconciled by accounting for analysts' in-house network centrality, a source of heterogeneity in information production that aggregate coverage measures overlook. Design/methodology/approach We use a large sample of US-listed firms to examine whether coverage by central analysts affects the extent and type of earnings management. Following recent studies, we measure analysts' centrality by their in-house connections and construct two firm-level variables to capture heterogeneity in network positions. Findings We find that although analyst coverage generally reduces both accrual-based and real earnings management, firms followed by more central analysts tend to substitute real activities manipulation for accrual-based methods. This pattern is consistent with the greater transparency effect rather than stronger monitoring or reduced pressure. Further analysis shows that the substitution effect weakens in firms with high information asymmetry or strong corporate governance and remains unchanged after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Originality/value These findings clarify the mechanisms through which analyst heterogeneity influences financial reporting behavior and help reconcile conflicting results in prior research.