The Demand Bargaining Set...
提出一种新的合作解概念“需求议价集”，它包含核心且被周氏议价集包含，能消除“被支配”的联盟结构。在常和齐次加权多数博弈中，该集合非空且预测唯一的需求向量，即最小获胜联盟内的比例分配。
The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the demand bargaining set, contains the core and is included in the Zhou bargaining set, eliminating the “dominated” coalition structures. The demand vectors belonging to the demand bargaining set are self-stable. In the class of constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority games the demand bargaining set is non-empty and predicts a unique demand vector, namely a proportional distribution within minimal winning coalitions. The noncooperative implementation of the demand bargaining set is obtained for all the games that satisfy the one-stage property.