The Freedom of Information Act and the Race Toward Information Acquisition
研究发现，对冲基金等机构投资者利用《信息自由法案》向美国食品药品监督管理局索取未公开信息，并借此获得超额收益，揭示了信息融入市场价格的机制。
We document a little-known source of information exploited by sophisticated institutional investors: the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a law that allows for the disclosure of previously unreleased information by the U.S. Government. Through FOIA requests, we identify several sophisticated institutional investors, chiefly hedge funds, that request information from the FDA. We explore the type of information commonly requested by funds and the types of firms that are targets of FDA-FOIA requests and show that FOIA requests allow these investors to generate abnormal returns. Thus, we illustrate a detailed mechanism through which costly information becomes incorporated into market prices.