Contracting with private rewards
扩展经典道德风险模型，允许代理人面临内生的不可契约化的不确定性，同时为主人工作和追求外部奖励，从而操纵其工作生活平衡，并分析最优契约的特征。
Abstract The canonical moral hazard model is extended to allow the agent to face endogenous and noncontractible uncertainty. The agent works for the principal and simultaneously pursues outside rewards. The contract offered by the principal thus manipulates the agent's work–life balance. The participation constraint is slack whenever it is optimal to distort the agent's work–life balance away from life compared to a symmetric‐information benchmark. Then, the agent's expected utility is high and he faces flatter incentives. Such contracts may be optimal when the two activities are strong substitutes in the agent's cost function or when reservation utility is low.