Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information
提出信念扭曲纳什均衡（BDNE）概念，用于分析玩家信息不完整、模糊或扭曲的动态博弈，并探讨其与纳什均衡的关系及存在性。
In this paper the concept of belief distorted Nash equilibrium (BDNE) is introduced. It is a new concept of equilibrium for games in which players have incomplete, ambiguous or distorted information about the game they play, especially in a dynamic context. The distortion of information of a player concerns the fact how the other players and/or an external system changing in response to players' decisions, are going to react to his/her current decision. The concept of BDNE encompasses a broader concept of pre-BDNE, which reflects the fact that players best respond to their beliefs, and self-verification of those beliefs. The relations between BDNE and Nash or subjective equilibria are examined, as well as the existence and properties of BDNE. Examples are presented, including models of a common ecosystem, repeated Cournot oligopoly, a repeated Minority Game or local public good with congestion effect and a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.