Non-audit services provided to audit clients, independence of mind and independence in appearance: latest evidence from large UK listed companies
研究了非审计服务费用是否损害审计师的实质独立性和形式独立性，发现费用过高会损害独立性，但市场也认可其带来的收益。
This paper investigates whether the provision of non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients impairs auditor independence of mind and independence in appearance. The main contributions of this paper are in terms of its timeliness with respect to regulatory changes, the simultaneous examination of both forms of auditor independence and the methodological innovation whereby it uses a variable derived from the level of abnormal audit fees as a moderating variable in order to capture the direct impact of the NAS fee level on auditor independence as well as how its influence is moderated by the level of unexpected audit fees. Our results indicate that auditor independence of mind is compromised by the size of NAS fees, particularly for clients who pay below the level of expected audit fee. The stock market perceives that auditor independence is compromised by NAS fees but, at the same time, additional tests indicate that there are benefits that accrue from NAS and, in particular, the relation between return and non-discretionary net income is increasing in NAS fees. The balance of evidence suggests that the European Union is correct in undertaking some reform of the auditing market.