Preventive and Deterrent Controls for Software Piracy
研究了软件出版商为应对盗版而采取的预防性和威慑性控制措施，通过分析模型发现预防性控制会降低利润，而威慑性控制可能增加利润，并提供了实证支持。
:In an attempt to protect their intellectual property and compete effectively in an increasingly dynamic marketplace, software publishers have employed a number of preventive and deterrent controls to counter software piracy. Conventional wisdom suggests that reducing piracy will force consumers to acquire software legitimately, thus increasing firm profits. We develop an analytical model to test the implications of antipiracy measures on publisher profits. Our results suggest that preventive controls decrease profits and deterrent controls can potentially increase profits. Empirical results are also presented that support the proposition on the impact of deterrent controls on the extent of software piracy derived from the analytical model.