Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
在Pérez-Castrillo和Wettstein的投标机制中引入折现，实现了折现沙普利值作为子博弈完美均衡的支付分配，并通过推广零玩家性质得到该解类的公理化。
In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001) who implemented the Shapley value for cooperative transferable utility games. This modification of the mechanism yields the corresponding discounted Shapley value as the payoff distribution in every subgame perfect equilibrium. The class of discounted Shapley values contains the Shapley value and equal division solution as its extreme cases. Interestingly, we obtain axiomatizations of each solution in this class by generalizing the null player property (of the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (of the equal division solution) to the so-called $$\delta $$ -reducing player property.